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Dilemmas in Donor Design:  
 
Organisational Reform and the Future of Foreign Aid Agencies 
 
 
 
By Nilima Gulrajani 
Global Economic Governance Programme 
University College, Oxford University 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
With growing uncertainty over the value and impact of traditional bilateral foreign aid 
to advance progress and development in poor countries, there is disquiet about the 
future of national public agencies and ministries with responsibility for managing and 
delivering international assistance.   Growing reputational damage to foreign aid has 
triggered a lively discussion in development policy circles about the best structural 
configuration for organizing and governing international development functions 
within donor countries.    To date, public administration scholars with expertise in 
questions of bureaucratic design and performance have yet to weigh in on this debate.  
This article is an attempt to present current controversies about donor governance and 
offer guidance for resolving current dilemmas by exploring the potential contributions 
of public administration. 
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It is a truth, although not at all universally acknowledged, that an international 
foreign aid agency in search of higher performance must be in want of some kind of 
reform.  Given the stubborn persistence of disease, poverty, conflict and 
unemployment, efforts at continual improvement are the modus operandi for most 
donor organisations struggling to demonstrate their effectiveness and self-worth.  As 
the world continues to perceive the international aid system as having failed to 
achieve the elimination of poverty—or worse, contributed to the endemic problems of 
corruption, inflation and aid dependency in developing countries—donor 
organisational reform has almost become endogenous to the act of aid-giving itself.    
 
The dimensions of donor effectiveness—the donor-related organisational 
features that have a credible and positive impact on aid effectiveness—demands 
closer scholarly attention (Gulrajani 2014).    Its importance is certainly underlined in 
high-level global statements (Development Assistance Committee 2005; 
Development Assistance Committee 2008; Wood, Betts et al. 2011).  Early on, the 
Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness set critical benchmarks for donor performance; 
never before had donors been held to specific, time-bound commitments to conduct 
their operations according to a globally accepted standard (Development Assistance 
Committee 2005).  Discouragingly, almost ten years later, an evaluation of the Paris 
Declaration noted donor ‘unevenness’ in meeting aid effectiveness targets and unmet 
‘commitments’ to changing ways of working (Wood, Betts et al. 2011; Wood June 15 
2011). A lack of policy structures, poor compliance, arbitrary decision-making and 
disconnects between corporate strategies and agendas are just some of the reasons 
attributed for donors not meeting their performance targets. 
  
This article explores whether a tremendous desire for reform and change to 
donor organisation has the potential to yield productive and promising outcomes. It 
offers a literature review of the ways donor organisations have been investigated 
within the social sciences to date.  Current interest in organisational reform is 
understood against the backdrop of numerous institutional pressures on traditional 
bilateral aid agencies to adapt and improve.  Such pressures condition the rise in 
popularity of donor governance reforms within the bilateral donor community.  By 
distinguishing between “known-knowns” and “known unknowns,” gaps in our 
knowledge are identified which can potentially be plugged by public administration 
scholars.  Overall, examining donor effectiveness is a possible new avenue for 
exploration at the intersection of public administration and international development.   
 
The study of aid donors: a literature review 
 
The world of development policy is demanding changes to the ways official 
aid donors are managed, structured and organised.   But what is an aid donor?  In this 
review, we define it as the administrative units tasked with development management 
by a country providing Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).  Using this 
definition, a donor can encompass a wide range of institutions, structures and 
departments within a donor country, including among others the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and a Development Agency or Ministry.  While 
foreign aid donors can be multilateral organisations as well, in this article we limit 
ourselves to an examination of bilateral donors.   
 
 3 
The study of donor organisational behavior has a long history in social 
sciences research.  Most of this research, however, has had little interest in robustly 
teasing out the relation between donor organisational attributes and overall aid 
effectiveness.   For the most part, the purpose of such scholarship has been to apply 
theoretical frameworks to explain the source of donor behavior rather than deeply 
investigate the sources of donor effectiveness.  In this regard, there have been missed 
opportunities to further the study of donor performance.        
 
International relations scholars have explored donor behavior as deriving 
from global norms and national state interests.  Donors are creatures of domestic 
politics, albeit with keen interests in international issues.  As such, they are embedded 
in both international and domestic environments with the need for legitimacy from 
both spheres to exist and thrive (Finnemore 1997; Boas and McNeill 2004; Weaver 
2008).   As Lancaster explains in her comparison of foreign aid donors, differences in 
donor policy choices are a product of the global imperative for wealthier countries to 
give aid to poorer ones intersecting with domestic political concerns and priorities 
(Lancaster 2007: 7-9).   This argument is refined in recent research that suggests it is 
only those international norms that are congruent with national motives for aid giving 
that influence behaviour (Maurits van der Veen, 2011).  Domestic politics and 
processes mediate the traction of global ideas and international political economy 
dynamics that ultimately influence donor conduct. 
 
Neo institutional economics borrows from rational public choice theory and 
Coasian theory of the firm to suggest that bilateral donors are involved in multiple 
principal-agent problems across the transnational spaces of development (Gibson, 
Andersson et al. 2005: 64; Martens 2005).  While the bilateral donor agency is in 
some cases a principal, for example to contractors and consultants hired to implement 
development projects, it can also be an agent for national taxpayers and their 
legislative representatives.  Donor behaviour is a result of relative cost-benefit 
calculations that occur within these nested principal-agent relations.  Donors freely 
decide these costs and benefits, although it is assumed they do so rationally in order to 
maximize expected utility.  Nonetheless, it is the broken feedback loops between 
donor agents and aid recipient principals that is one of the most distinctive and 
important aspects of the aid delivery chain.  This is because recipient principles live in 
different countries and political constituencies, without a punitive sanction 
mechanism to ensure donor agents are acting in their interests (Martens 2002: 14).  
The ultimate principal for the donor agency thus remains its domestic publics and 
these actors must ultimately be satisfied with bilateral donors.   
 
Organisational sociologists have pointed to the ambiguous mandates of donor 
agencies that are the result of contradictory pressures in the environment (Quarles van 
Ufford 1988; Cornwall and Brock 2005).  In the complexity of a multi-stakeholder 
milieu, organisational legitimacy is derived from a constellation of sites.  Donor 
mission statements become deliberate attempts to curry favour from all quarters 
instead of presenting objective prioritized statements on official policies and goals 
(Babb 2003: 5; Cooke 2003; Craig and Porter 2006; Murphy 2008).  In their quest for 
legitimacy, donors rely on fuzzy diplomatic buzzwords, adopt unrealistic policies and 
claim adherence to contradictory strategies and solutions (Quarles van Ufford 1988; 
Cornwall and Brock 2005).  
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Anthropologists with interests in foreign aid treat the people, policies and 
organisations of international development as ethnographic objects worthy of study in 
their own right (Long and Long 1992; Lewis, Bebbington et al. 2003; Mosse 2005: 
11-12; Mosse and Lewis 2005; Mosse 2011).  The study of the aid-worker is central 
as it is they that have the capability for autonomous behavior within the complex, 
diffuse global realm of development policy (Weisband and Ebrahim 2007).   Their 
roles include brokering and translating policies, relationships and representations into 
tangible and meaningful actions.  Nevertheless, the aid worker is often implicitly 
stripped of her discretion as the pressure to appear infallible limits opportunities to 
make mistakes, to learn and to critically reflect on options (Ferguson 1994; Eyben 
2003; Jassey 2004).  Donor behavior becomes the product of micro-behaviours, 
attitudes and cultures interacting with macro-level structures.  
 
Although public administration scholarship has richly and insightfully 
examined the performance of donor-led policies or reforms in developing countries 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2004; Grindle 2004; Andrews 2014), it rarely uses its 
own theoretical arsenal to explore the organisational attributes of aid agencies 
themselves that impinge on outcomes. There are some notable exceptions to this, 
particularly within the pages of Public Administration and Development.1  But 
overall, theories of public administration have yet to be applied to the study of aid 
agencies to develop a coherent literature on donors as public actors.   This is a shame 
because as developing countries reflect on the institutional set up of their own donor 
bureaucracies, public administration scholarship would the most obvious discipline to 
advise these policy choices.  If they can be availed of, there are exciting opportunities 
for extending the study of public administration in development to an examination of 
the public administration of development.2   
     
The context for donor reform and renewal 
 
The desire to advance donor effectiveness is driven by a number of concerns 
about the state of foreign aid as an arena of public activity.  In the new operating 
context of development, the bilateral donor community faces a number of shared 
anxieties that appear to demand renewal and reform.  The seven areas of concern 
listed below provide the backdrop for growing interest in the organisational 
performance of donors.    
 
1. Fiscal retrenchment   
 
The global financial crisis and turmoil in the Eurozone have put aid budgets under 
significant pressure.  Retrenchment in developed countries is largely blamed for aid’s 
                                                 
1
 See Wunsch, J. (1986). "Administering rural development: have goals outreached organizational 
capacity?" Public Administration and Development 6: 287-308, Maddock, N. (1992). "Local 
management of aid-funded projects." Public Administration and Development 12(4): 399-407, 
Hirschmann, D. (2002). "Thermometer or Sauna? Performance Measurement and Democratic 
Assistance in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)." Public 
Administration 80(2): 235-255, Saltmarshe, D., M. Ireland, et al. (2003). "The Performance 
Framework: A Systems Approach to Understanding Performance Management." Public Administration 
and Development 23: 445-456..   
2
 This phrase is a variant of Thomas’s call to move an examination of management in development to 
an examination of management of development.  Thomas, A. (1996). "What is Development 
Management?" Journal of International Development 8(1): 95-110. 
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6% drop in real terms between 2010 and 2012.3   While these declines appear to have 
been reversed in 2013, there is a worrying fall in aid shares going to the neediest 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.4  Reforms that cut overheads, achieve efficiency 
gains and streamline operations remain popular among all donors, not just the 11 
DAC countries that reported a decrease in ODA budgets in 2013.  As the fiscal 
environment in donor countries deteriorate, so too does the general perception that 
foreign aid is provided at the expense of the poor at home (Lancaster 2007).   In such 
an unfavourable climate, the power and status of donor bureaucracy all wane. 
 
2. Competition from other actors 
 
As aid budgets shrink, commercial organisations encroach on the mandate of donors 
as emissaries of international poverty reduction.  These competitors include: venture 
philanthropists who have pledged significant sums to tackle global challenges; hybrid 
social enterprises encouraging pro-poor venturing; and large corporations investing in 
global public goods.  Commercial money and mindsets put public sector involvement 
in development on the back foot, even if there is a risk of over confidence in the 
ability of corporates to solve endemic market failures and remove the impediments to 
real poverty reduction (Blowfield and Dolan 2014).  The convergence of ODA and 
private sector agendas has meant the latter is perceived as a plausible substitute for 
donors, challenging the viability and survival of the public aid agency (Kharas and 
Rogerson 2012).   
 
3. Shrinking mandates 
 
The management and delivery of government-to-government aid is the defining 
responsibility of a donor.   In today’s climate, that mandate is perceived to be a 
remnant of a postwar era captivated by large administrations.  Accusations of 
bureaucratic archaism are launched alongside claims of irrelevancy as non-aid 
policies are identified as more germane for global development.  Trade, climate 
change, global remittances, migration policy, technological change, tax policy, 
emergency relief, military assistance: all these are seen to be alternative pathways to 
improving living standards with a more robust track record than ODA.  As the 
salience and relevance of each of these policy arenas grows in global development 
discourse, the profiles of aid departments and ministries diminishes.  As a result, 
donor administrations lose power and profile within whole-of-government fora 
concerning the content and coherence of domestic policy for international 
development.   
 
4. Emerging markets 
 
The problem of shrinking donor mandates is exacerbated as the pool of poor country 
clients contracts, leaving a new geography of global poverty for which traditional 
donors are poorly equipped (Sumner and Kanbur 2011; Bond 2015). Remarkable 
economic growth and poverty reduction in emerging markets are attributed to trade 
openness, foreign investment and technological development—not foreign aid 
(UNDP 2013).  With such growth, there are now fewer aid dependent countries, while 
                                                 
3
 http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm 
4
 http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-
high.htm 
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those that remain low income countries suffer from the intractable difficulties of 
failed and fragile states and humanitarian catastrophe (World Bank 2014).  
Meanwhile, emerging markets are cultivating their own foreign aid programmes and 
engaging in South-South international cooperation efforts that rival those of the DAC 
or G7.  Between 2001-2011, non-DAC donors more than doubled their aid from just 
under US$ 5 billion to US$ 16.8 billion.5  The discontent expressed by the US over 
the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank underlines 
this changing nature of global hegemonic power.   As Southern aid flows rise and 
geopolitical axes shift, the future configurations of bilateral foreign aid provided by 
traditional DAC donors grows even more uncertain. 
 
5. Donor failure 
 
There is now acceptance that the Millennium Development Goals, a key set of 
objectives for the aid community, will not be reached.  Donors only achieved one of 
the targets in the Paris Declaration benchmarking their own performance, and this one 
was achieved virtually at the time it was set in 2005 (Mawdsley, Savage et al. 2013).  
Against such failure, aid agencies are also perceived to be less responsive to both their 
financial backers (voters) and their beneficiaries (Kharas and Rogerson 2012). There 
is a palpable and growing insecurity in the donor community with every best seller 
lamenting the way aid fosters corruption, inflation, dependency, and lucrative tax-free 
employment with perks, among other horrors.  Greater transparency exposes 
problems and unmet expectations in such a way that contributes to a crisis of 
legitimacy for the foreign aid sector, even amongst some of its most ardent supporters 
(MacGee 2015).  Perceptions of failure threaten donor survival, resulting in a desire to 
engage in visible reforms that can shore up credibility.   
 
6. Political ideology 
 
Among all the factors within domestic political systems that impinge upon foreign aid 
administrations and policies, one of the most widely assumed is that social democratic 
left-leaning governments are ideologically more supportive of foreign aid consistent 
with development than conservative or right-leaning ones (Tingley 2010). Recent 
evidence for this certainly exists in Canada and Australia, where Conservative-led 
governments demolished their development ministries, subordinating them to the 
authority of their foreign affairs ministries.  The rise of right-leaning governments in 
donor countries may at least explain why aid administrations are increasingly feeling 
insecure in their positions.    
 
 
Given these trends, it is no wonder that many are demanding change, with 
such calls even heard among aid’s strongest backers.  This is not to say that foreign 
aid has completely lost its shine (Sachs 2005; Kenny 2011).  Rather, it is to say that 
aid donor survival increasingly depends on having a platform of adaptation and 
reform, with those unaware of how to defensively evolve in this changing landscape 
likely to face difficulties (Kharas and Rogerson 2012).  Without organisational 
reform, the future of aid donors looks decidedly bleak.   
 
                                                 
5
 http://devinit.org/development-cooperation-emerging-providers-rising/ 
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Donor reform: The case for better governance 
 
Organisational variables within donor agencies have a critical, if sometimes 
imperceptible, effect on aid outcomes (Tendler 1975: 2).  The success or failure of 
donor policies and programmes, decision-making processes and strategic management 
systems will always be mediated by organsiational variables like structures, goals, 
motivations and cultures.  Nevertheless, the relation between these organisational 
factors—the design attributes relating people, things, knowledge and technologies 
within a formal framework intended to achieve specific goals6—and aid effectiveness 
remains poorly understood in any single donor entity, let along theorized across the 
donor collective.   
 
Effective public governance is one such organisational variable, a necessary 
condition for sustainable long-lasting poverty reduction.  This is as much the case 
within aid-receiving countries seeking to achieve domestic development goals, as it is 
when central government ministries and departmental agencies are tasked with 
international cooperation for poverty reduction across national borders. Donor 
governance structures are the rules, relationships and responsibilities of the unit 
tasked with development management vis a vis national actors with overseas interests 
and mandates (Gulrajani 2014).  Reform to donor governance has become something 
of a cause celebre, with Canada, Australia and Italy all altering their public 
governance over the past 18 months.  The rest of this article explores what is and isn’t 
known about this type of reform and the productive ways that scholars of public 
administration can engage in the study of foreign aid donors to enhance their 
performance.   
 
While donor governance involves relations with a range of domestic actors, 
the linkage between the organisational unit managing aid and development and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is at the heart of administrative design choices.  
MFAs are high-status central government departments, albeit without a monopoly 
over international relations.  MFAs do not exclusively represent the state in foreign 
affairs as globalization internationalizes the functions and scope of domestic public 
administration (OECD 1996; Warning 2009).  This is particularly the case as non-aid 
policies like trade, climate change, immigration, military spending (among others) 
now all impinge on global development.   The inter-connectedness of domestic policy 
raises some uncertainty about where formal responsibility for development policy 
should lie within national administrative systems and the possibility that a range of 
formal choices and informal practices exist.  But as the unquestionable overarching 
coordinator of foreign affairs, MFAs have a pivotal influence over the development 
agenda even within an aid architecture that grants development stand-alone 
ministerial status.   
 
With such a pivotal role for the MFA, there will always be a finite number of 
governance models to choose from (Figure 1).  These four models of donor 
governance are distinguished by the degrees to which aid and development policy has 
merged with the foreign affairs function.  In contradistinction to this four-part 
                                                 
6
 Definition adapted from Clegg, S., M. Kornberger, et al. (2010). Managing and Organizations. 
Londong, Sage..  
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classification, choices about donor governance tend to be colloquially articulated in 
binary terms:  either a bilateral programme has its own bureaucratic structure (agency 
or ministry) or it is a subsumed within ministries of foreign affairs.   However, it 
would be more accurate to talk about three models of donor governance given the 
relatively minor variation in the structural arrangements of Model 1 and 2:  (1) an 
integrated structure (as in Model 1 and 2) (2) a sub-contracted structure (Model 3) (3) 
an autonomous structure (Model 4))   
 
There is an emerging consensus in the world of aid policy that the functional 
task of managing aid is better done within an integrated model within foreign affairs 
ministries, even if there is evidence to suggest the contrary (Gulrajani 2010; Gulrajani 
2014).   The imperatives of intra-governmental cooperation, policy coherence, cost-
cutting and competition were certainly some of the justifications provided by Canada 
and Australia to justify the recent integration of their development agencies into the 
foreign affairs ministries.7   A 2014 International Development Select Committee 
(IDC) Enquiry into future approaches to UK aid also raised the spectre of integrating 
the Department for International Development (DfID), asking witnesses to assess 
whether there was any place for a stand-alone agency in the current operating 
environment of international development for which there was strong support.   Given 
the UK is the only bilateral donor with an independent agency structure (Table 1), 
there is certainly reason to be concerned about the future of an autonomous 
development ministry. 
 
Teasing out arguments for and against an integrated donor governance system 
requires understanding “known knowns” and “unknown knowns” about the pathways 
between donor governance and aid effectiveness.  The following are some of the more 
accepted known ‘facts’: 
 
1. Donor governance systems, like other organisational design phenomena, 
exhibit significant path dependency due to their foundation in a country’s 
administrative traditions. Deep cultural and political legacies can explain both 
the existence of certain governance models as well as their performance.   For 
example, Sweden has had a dualist system of government resting on the 
constitutional separation of policy and administration (Yesilkagit and 
Christensen 2010).  Derived from a 19
th
 century historical compromise 
between lower and higher nobility, this led to a constitutional provision where 
members of government do not issue orders to bureaucracy.   Dualism 
represents a division between government’s responsibility for policy planning 
and political advisory functions and central agencies’ responsibility for policy 
administration and implementation.  This principle continues to drive the 
choice of donor governance in Sweden, such that recent efforts to reform 
Swedish aid governance have not disbanded the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) even as its policy, managerial and financial 
autonomy have all been curtailed (Hudson and Jonsson 2009).    
 
2. Donor governance systems are the main ways national bureaucratic agents of 
development maintain their accountability to their principals, including other 
government departments, the executive branch and legislative assemblies.    
                                                 
7
 http://devpolicy.org/o-cida-dismantling-ausaid-the-canadian-way-20131115/  
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Governance systems service national constituencies’ need for control and 
oversight over aid and development policy, ensuring they are acting according 
to stipulated requirements and keeping them abreast of problem and 
achievements.  The motivations for control can range from the more prosaic—
for example, to achieve policy coherence, efficiency or improved quality—to 
the more parochial—servicing national foreign and trade policy interests or 
reducing bureaucratic power.     The range of motivations is suggestive of a 
spectrum of possible impacts and effects. 
 
3. Whether as trigger or filter, the domestic political context of aid policy can 
unpredictably impinge on the choice of donor governance regime, the nature 
and timing of the changes that happens, and the probability that this structure 
lives up to expectations for it.   For example, closer alignment between the 
Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in 2004 has roots in the desire for greater control and 
oversight over the agency by a Minister of International Development who 
lacked authority and influence at the time (Gulrajani 2014).  Meanwhile, the 
1997 creation of DfID as a UK government department distinct from the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) resulted from strong political 
champions for an independent governance model.  With the help of powerful 
friends, DfID was invested with considerable influence to steer development 
agendas within a whole-of-government framework (Lockwood, Mulley et al. 
2010).  Meanwhile, when Canada integrated the 45-year-old Canadian 
International Development Department (CIDA) into the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) in 2013, it was viewed as 
the natural culmination of years of political neglect of the aid and 
development agenda that left CIDA exposed, weak and a natural candidate for 
reform.  In contrast to the Canadian experience, the decision to amalgamate 
the Australian Aid Agency (AusAID) into the Australian Government of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in September 2013 was unexpected, 
announced without advance warning by newly sworn-in Australian Prime 
Minister, Tony Abbott.  The merger was the decisive and explosive first act by 
a new PM from the centre-right Liberal Party.  One blogger likened the 
political action to AusAID “suffering a heart attack,” whereas CIDA’s closure 
that marked the end of a “long, drawn-out illness”.8  By contrast, there are 
suggestions that Italy’s decision to strengthen its development cooperation 
with the creation of an independent aid agency is reflective of the “Italian 
government’s intention to take itself more seriously when it comes to 
international relations” after years of lagging behind donor development 
indexes.”9   
 
4. To date, there is limited econometric or comparative case study evidence 
supporting a strong causal link between any model of donor governance and 
more effective aid as measured on any dimension (ie. efficiency, results, 
policy coherence, etc).  A recent paper suggests that models 1 and 4 are 
associated with higher aid quantity and quality but uses neither econometric 
nor comparative case studies to establish this claim (Faure, Long et al. 
                                                 
8
 http://devpolicy.org/o-cida-dismantling-ausaid-the-canadian-way-20131115/ 
9
 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/aug/13/italy-new-bilateral-
development-agency 
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forthcoming).  Instead, they develop associations by calculating average 
scores on various aid quality indices and presenting data by model type.  
Meanwhile, comparative case study material does demonstrate that 
autonomous models benefit from a more robust and politically empowered 
development agenda (Gulrajani 2010; Gulrajani 2014).   
 
5. Empirically, there is almost universal rejection of an independent ministry as a 
contemporary donor governance structure (Table 1).  Meanwhile, among the 
Southern donor community, almost all have adopted or intend to adopt 
integrated models of donor governance, notwithstanding the lack of robust 
evidence supporting this trajectory for reform.   In 2012, India created their 
Development Partnership Administration (DPA) within the Ministry of 
External Affairs (Chaturvedi, Chenoy et al. 2014).  The Brazilian 
Development Cooperation (ABC) is formally located in the Ministry of 
External Affairs (Younis, Wilson et al. 2014). In China, it is unusually the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the lead agency in managing foreign 
aid, under which two new sub-divisions, the Department of Aid to Foreign 
Countries (DAFC) and the Department of International Cooperation (Gu, 
Chen et al. 2014).  Current proposals suggest the South African Development 
Partnership Agency will be located within Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (Grobbelaar, Chen et al. 2014).    
 
Although what is known to date does not prove a robust relationship between 
donor governance and effectiveness, neither can such a relation be discredited 
entirely.  The next section raises critical questions about the narrative that integration 
within an MFA drives donors to perform and suggests future lines of enquiry for 
public administration researchers.   
 
 
Integrated donor governance: unknowns and directions for future research  
 
There are reasons for being equivocal about the robustness of integrating a 
development programme within an MFA.  A number of areas of concern are 
identified below.  New directions are provided for the ways public administration 
research may progress our knowledge of donor governance and its relationship to 
donor effectiveness.   
 
1. Exploring path dependencies 
 
Although integration is a dominant donor governance model, there is scant 
evidence that this is the most effective form of organising bilateral aid for achieving 
lasting poverty reduction.  Public administration theory could point to a number of 
alternative explanations.  For example, donors may be engaging in copycat adaptation 
by adopting integrated models that can shore up legitimacy and credibility in today’s 
political environment.  As an act of mimetic institutional isomorphism, there is reason 
to believe that reforms will not address the real sources of underperformance, even if 
they are rational for organisational survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983).   Alternatively, the popularity of integration may simply be evidence of 
a common historical administrative record, as in the case of many of the Scandinavian 
countries or, conversely, the absence of one as in the case of Southern donors.  It is 
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also are not clear if integrated governance structures that emerge from a protracted 
historical process add more value than integration that is the product of a strategic 
policy decision.    Public administration is ideally suited to investigating the 
underlying institutional and historical foundations for integration, which in turn can 
inform our knowledge of the outcomes and consequences of adopting organisational 
structures themselves.   
 
2. Street-level bureaucrats 
 
Policy and operational professionals populate donor bureaucracies, even if these 
actors tend to be silent figures in the bulk of foreign aid agency research (albeit with a 
few exceptions in anthropologically informed work). Yet, these ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ are worthy of attention for their axiomatic discretion and autonomy and 
their ability to shape public policy in significant ways (Elmore 1979; Lipsky 1980; 
Gulrajani 2006; Hupe and Hill 2007: 280; Gulrajani 2008). This individual-level 
approach to the study of public administration can allow for rigorous examinations of 
complex socially embedded relationships, the nature of work in foreign aid and 
permits observation of actual effects in practice (Hupe and Hill 2007: 286; Weisband 
and Ebrahim 2007: 3).  Public administrative analyses at this level can inform the 
choice of donor governance structures, including appropriate levels of delegation 
between field offices and headquarters and performance incentives for managing and 
delivering aid flows.   
 
3. Polycentric accountability 
 
As mentioned, the introduction of integrated donor governance structures are 
motivated by the imperative of upward accountability to national bureaucratic, 
legislative and executive actors.  The danger is that strengthening governance in this 
direction comes at the cost of accountability to others, particularly those with less 
power and influence over donor nations and yet whose input is critical for improving 
aid’s performance (Martens 2005: 14; Eyben 2008; Steer, Wathne et al. 2009). In the 
case of Canada, merging aid and development functions into DFATD centralized 
power and resources in such a way that has checked active pluralistic participation in 
development policy, including the input of aid beneficiaries and national civil society 
organisations.   Public administration is well placed to assess the degree to which 
public compliance and risk mitigation imperatives are at odds with donor obligations 
to account to all stakeholders.   It may also introduce variant more polycentric models 
of accountability as alternatives to the top-down delegated model, including 
approaches anchored in human relations that privilege more active relational forms of  
of responsibility and the cultivation of moral and social sensibilities (Bovens 1998; 
Gregory 2003; Gulrajani 2010; Tilley 2014). An analysis of power and conflict over 
standards of behavior could also be more forcefully integrated into discussions about 
the best type of donor structure for democratic accountability systems (Weisband and 
Ebrahim 2007; Yi-Chong and Weller 2008). 
 
4. Transnational public administration and boundary-spanning 
 
National administrative systems are now more likely to be engaged in activities 
with global ramifications as well as informed by international agendas (Gulrajani and 
Moloney 2012; Jreisat 2012).  Transnational public administration is a product of 
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globalisation infusing national policy objectives resulting in national public 
administrations unable to pursue objectives single-handedly.  In many cases, spheres 
of responsibility for ministries have widened while competencies remain constant 
(Warning, 2009). Transnational public administration can inform the design of 
structures, improve capacity and strengthen competencies affected by these growing, 
globalizing agendas where activities span jurisdictional, administrative and sectoral 
boundaries (O'Flynn 2014).  This is particularly important in international 
development, where looking beyond aid to other domestic policy spheres for global 
development requires coordination, coherence as well as translation across 
global/local divides.10  Establishing the transnational division of labour and funding 
profiles of bilateral agencies and multilateral agencies is another area that could 
benefit from boundary-spanning frameworks of public administration.   
 
 
5. Collaborative management 
 
Related to transnational dynamics, growing acceptance that aid is now but one 
element of a multi-policy bilateral development strategy puts the imperative on 
collaborative management.  This is particularly the case in bilateral development 
policy where an MFA is mandated to represent and vocalize the national domestic 
interest in international affairs.  Development ministries, by contrast, are the only 
government actor to represent and act in the collective global interest.   While 
collective global interests and national interests are not always and everywhere zero-
sum in nature, championing policies that contravene domestic ambitions and priorities 
suggests conflict is inevitable (Pratt 2000).  Theories and tools of collaborative 
management may help inform appropriate negotiation tactics and whole-of-
government solutions for a development programme that preserves strategic foreign 
policy agendas with minimal sacrifice of the global public good agenda.  In other 
cases, collaborative management frameworks may bring transparency to the tradeoffs 
that need to be made.  For example, in the case of middle power Norway where 
leadership on global development is a valuable source of soft power, the development 
agenda remains partly insulated from encroachment and dilution by competing 
domestic priorities (Gulrajani 2010).  By contrast, in China where power emerges 
from its economic hegemony, integrating the global development programme within 
MOFCOM will necessarily involve subordinating its aims to commercial imperatives.    
Understanding such nuances can distinguish between valuable and futile opportunities 
for collaboration and their corresponding governance structures.   
 
6. Politics-administrative dichotomy 
 
Separating those who steer policy from those who implement it was a key plank 
of New Public Management thinking.  The division of political and administrative 
functions in this manner prompted the creation of numerous specialised arms’ length 
agencies of government.  Public administration has sought to investigate both the 
viability of such a separation, as well as the record of its success (Pollitt 1990; Svara 
2001; Gill 2002; Overeem 2005; Overeem 2006; Svara 2006; Overeem 2008; 
Yesilkagit and Christensen 2010).    While no definite answer has been arrived at, 
                                                 
10
 For example, in the case of the UK’s Ebola response, ten Whitehall departments, four arms length 
bodies, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, all had to coordinate operations and policy.    
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asking similar questions of the various models of donor governance could be of 
immense value.   Is the separation of policy and implementation worthy in the case of 
bilateral development programmes and if so, how best should this be organised?   
What is the relationship between structure, performance and value-for-money?    Such 
questions are comfortably within the scope of both public administration theory and 
research.   
 
 
Looking beyond donor governance 
 
 
Perhaps more than establishing with any certainty the superiority of a donor 
governance structure, what is needed is a way to ensure that whatever structure is in 
place, there is knowledge of how to tweak and tailor it to maximize the likelihood of 
donor effectiveness.  Public administration can help in this regard by inserting new 
lines of enquiry into current debates about donor effectiveness, uncovering issues 
behind the structural façade of governance that may be more germane to the search 
for development results.   An over-preoccupation with typologies of donor 
governance risks bypassing the non-structural sources of donor underperformance.11   
 
Organising an effective donor aid agency is no exact science.    The choice 
and processes of organisational design is ultimately influenced by the richness of 
dynamics within the entity that is a target for reform.  Exploring both the design and 
the life within are the bread and butter of public administration. Organisational factors 
within bilateral donor agencies matter for aid effectiveness, and perhaps even for the 
long-term survival of foreign aid itself.  We ignore them at our peril.   
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 For example, in the case of Canada, a preoccupation with organisational design that culminated in 
the disbanding of CIDA conveniently deflected attention from real sources of poor performance, 
including weak political stewardship, lack of strategy policy direction, low staff motivation and 
burdensome reporting requirements (Black and Tiessen 2007; Brown 2011; Essex 2012).   
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Four models of donor governance 
	
		 																							 	
Model	1.		The	ministry	of	foreign	affairs	
takes	the	lead	and	is	responsible	for	
policy	and	implementation	
Model	2.	A	development	cooperation	
directorate	within	the	ministry	of	foreign	
affairs	leads	and	is	responsible	for	policy	
and	implementation
	
	
																										 	
Model	3.		A	ministry	has	overall	
responsibility	for	policy	and	a	separate	
executing	agency	is	responsible	for	
implementation.			
	
Model	4.		A	ministry	or	agency,	other	than	
the	ministry	of	foreign	affairs,	is	
responsible	for	both	policy	and	
implementation			
	  
Source: OECD (2009)
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Table 1.  OECD DAC bilateral donors by governance system  
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Australia  X*   
Austria   X  
Belgium   X  
Canada X*    
Denmark X    
Finland  X   
France   X  
Germany   X  
Greece  X   
Ireland  X   
Italy   X**  
Japan   X  
Luxembourg   X  
Netherlands  X   
New Zealand  X   
Norway X    
Portugal   X  
Spain   X  
Sweden   X  
Switzerland  X   
UK    X 
US   X  
Total 3 7 11 1 
 
Source: OECD (2009) p. 31.   
*Data for Australia and Canada altered based on 2013 organigrams 
** Data for Italy based on announced plans of governance reform in August 2014 
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